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SYNOPSIS: The purpose of this paper is to document auditors' responses to first-time debt covenant
vioiations and to determine whether these responses can be used to predict financiai distress. The
data reveai, consistent with SFAS No. 78, that auditors are more iikely to require debt rec las sifi cation
when the violations are not waived by lenders. In contrast, the waiver decision does not appear to
significantly influence the auditor's qualification decision. The empiricai tests also show that for firms
experiencing technical defauit, the audit opinion is an important determinant of future financial dis-
tress, even after controlling for factors typically associated with bankruptcy.
Data Availability: Data that are used in this study are available from public sources.
INTRODUCTION
Positive accounting theory assumes that
debt covenant violation is costly and, as a re-
sult, that managers prefer to avoid incidents
of technical default (Watts and Zimmerman
1986).^  Based on this premise, accounting re-
searchers have expended considerable effort de-
termining the types of firms that are most
likely to encounter default (Press and Weintrop
1990) and the costs that are associated with
default (Beneish and Press 1993). More re-
cently, studies have evaluated how a variety
of parties—managers (Defond and Jiambalvo
1994; Sweeney 1994), lenders (Chen and Wei
1993) and investors (Beneish and Press 1995a,
1995b)—respond to incidents of technical
default. By documenting the differential
reactions that occur across different users,
these studies have significantly enhanced our
understanding of debt covenant effects.
The present paper complements this line
of research by examining auditors' responses
to debt covenant violations. The first part of
the study investigates the determinants of au-
ditors' debt reclassification and qualification
decisions, while the second seeks to determine,
conditional on technical default, whether the
actions taken by auditors can be used to pre-
dict future financial distress. The results indi-
cate that when firms encounter technical de-
fault, auditors' actions are infiuenced in part
by the actions of lenders. Specifically, auditors
use both financial statement data and waiver
decisions in determining the appropriate
course of action when their clients experience
technical default. Empirical tests also reveal
that defaulting firms that receive qualified
audit opinions face an increased likelihood of
financial distress in subsequent periods. These
findings contribute to the literature by docu-
menting how auditors respond to technical
' Throughout this paper the terms "covenant violation,"
"covenant default," and "default" are nsed synony-
mously to refer to technical violations of accounting-
based or other debt covenants. Technical defaxilt dif-
fers from debt service default, which involves missed
principal or interest payments.
Initial drafts of this paper benefited from the comments
of Dan Dhaliwal, Mark Trombley, Sanjay Kallapur,
Linda Bamber, Paige Fields, Neil Fargher, Jenny Gaver
and Audrey Gramling. I would also like to thank James
Flagg, Lori Holder-Webb, Ed Swanson, three anony-
mous reviewers and the associate editor, Jane Mutchler,
for their contributions to the current manuscript.
Submitted August 1996
Accepted July 1997
Corresponding Author: Michael S. Wilkins
Email: mswilks@tamvml.tamu.edu
Technical Default, Auditors' Decisions and Future Financial Distress 41
default and by demonstrating that auditors'
decisions can be used to evaluate the situa-
tions likely to be faced by violating firms in
subsequent periods.
The remainder of the paper is structured
as follows. In section two, background infor-
mation regarding technical default and audi-
tors' decisions is provided. In section three, the
data collection procedures are explained and
summary data are presented. Section four pre-
sents the empirical analysis, and a summary
is provided in section five.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section describes the context within
which the two types of auditor decisions (quali-
fication and debt reclassification) are made.
The general authority regarding debt reclas-
sification comes from SFAS No. 78,Classiflca-
tion of Obligations that are Callable by the
Creditor. According to SFAS No. 78, the short-
term classification is intended to include obli-
gations that are callable either (1) because the
act of default triggers the lender's right to ac-
celerate the debt, or (2) because the firm's fail-
ure to cure the violation within a specified
grace period will make the debt callable. Un-
der either of these conditions, the debt should
be classified as current unless a waiver is re-
ceived or, assuming a grace period exists, if it
is likely that the violation will be cured within
the grace period {FASB 1983).
Even if waivers are received, however,
firms may be required to reclassify the debt as
short-term. According to FASB 1986, Classifi-
cation of Obligations when a Violation is
Waiued by the Creditor, the debt may require
current classification if "(a) a covenant viola-
tion has occurred at the balance sheet date or
would have occurred absent a loan modifica-
tion and (b) it is probable that the borrower
will not be able to cure the default (comply
with the covenant) at measurement dates that
are within the next 12 months." Therefore,
auditors must exercise some judgment regard-
less of whether lenders have granted waivers
at the balance sheet date. Given the provisions
of SFAS No. 78, however, firms failing to re-
ceive waivers would seem to be more likely
candidates for reclassification.
A related issue involves the interaction
between the reclassification decision and the
audit opinion. Specifically, does the act of re-
classification require or suggest that a quali-
fied opinion will be issued? There is little doubt
that the two decisions are related; ceterispari-
bus, firms experiencing debt reclassification
are more likely to face accelerated repayment
and the corresponding liquidity difficulties. As
a result, such firms also are more likely to be
classified as going concern problems. However,
under Statement on Auditing Standards No.
58, reclassification in and of itself does not
warrant a change in the auditor's standard un-
qualified report. In fact, the coiTelation be-
tween reclassification and qualification likely
was stronger before AICPA 1988, when quali-
fications could be granted "subject-to" the ef-
fects of a variety of material uncertainties. For
example, in this study, which is comprised en-
tirely of pre-SAS No. 58 opinions, 67 percent
of the firms having their debt reclassified to
short-term received qualified opinions, while
only 39 percent were issued going concern
qualifications. In essence, although the quali-
fication decision certainly is not independent
of the reclassification decision, the existence
of one does not necessarily imply the presence
of the other.
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Data Collection
The sample used in this study consists of
159 firms traded on the NYSE/AMEX or
NASDAQ, and having initial default dates
ranging fi-om 1978 to 1988.^  To collect data re-
garding the covenant violations, annual report
or Form 10-K filings were examined for each
sample firm from year -2 through year +2 rela-
tive to the initially identified year of default
(i.e., a minimum of five years). This procedure
was utilized to determine whether covenants
^ The sample of firms used in this study comes from
three sources: (1) firms used hy Chen and Wei (1993);
(2) firms used by Beneish and Press (1993); and (3)
firms identified using a search of the LEXIS network
for the years 1984-1986. Chen and Wei (1993) used
Compact Disclosure to identify firms in violation dur-
ing the years 1985-1988, and Beneish and Press (1993)
searched Compact Disclosure, NAARS and the Dow
Jones News Service for the years 1983-1987. Many
firms were common across two or more of the sample
sources and these duplicate firms were included only
once.
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had been violated prior to the initially-iden-
tified event years and whether firms remained
in violation after the initially identified event
years. If a violation was found in year -2 or -
1, financial statements were examined prior
to these years until two consecutive years of
compliance were discovered. For example, if a
firm had been identified as having an initial
covenant violation in 1986, but was discovered
to have a previous violation in 1984, the ini-
tial violation year was redefined as 1984 and
years -1 and -2 were redefined as 1983 and
1982. Financial statements in the post-viola-
tion period were examined until two consecu-
tive years of compliance were discovered.
Therefore, if a firm had an initial violation in
1984 and had additional violations in 1986 and
1987, data were collected fi-om 1982 (year -2)
through 1989 (two years of compliance after
the final violation in 1987).
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the complete sample
of firms are presented in table 1. In panel A,
median values are summarized as of the end
of the fiscal year prior to the initial covenant
violation (year -1), the end of the fiscal year of
the initial covenant violation (year 0), and the
end of the fiscal year subsequent to the initial
covenant violation (year+1). Table 1 illustrates
that violating firms experienced increasing
debt levels and decreasing equity values across
the three-year period. Table 1 also shows that
covenant violations are associated with de-
creased liquidity and decreased profitability.^
Panel B reveals the same trends that are docu-
mented by Beneish and Press (1993), namely
that firms facing violation have significantly
lower equity values, profitability levels and li-
quidity levels, and significantly higher debt
levels than do their industry counterparts. In
total, the summary data suggest that incidents
of default are likely to be associated with firms
that are experiencing deteriorating financial
health.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Univariate Tests
Auditor Decisions vs. Lender Decisions
This section of the paper presents a series
of 2 X 2 contingency tables which examine the
association between auditors' and lenders' re-
sponses to initial debt covenant violations. In
these tables, the response of the auditor is as-
sumed to be the dependent effect. Based on the
development in section two, auditors should
be more likely to require that the violated debt
be reclassified to short-term if waivers are not
granted. Similarly, it is expected that firms
failing to receive waivers will be more likely
to receive qualified audit opinions.
The results of the initial tests are presented
in table 2. The data support a significant rela-
tion between the waiver partition and the
auditor's debt reclassification decision. Only
17 percent (15 of 89) of the firms receiving
waivers had their debt reclassified to short-
term, while 49 percent (34 of 70) of the firms
failing to receive waivers were subject to re-
classification. These results are consistent with
auditors using lenders' decisions to proxy for
the likelihood that debt repayment will be ac-
celerated into the current year. Table 2 also
illustrates, however, that auditors exercise a
fair amount of judgment when waivers are not
granted. Specifically, auditorsfor over half (36
of 70) of the firms failing to receive default
waivers apparently estimated that the viola-
tions would be cured within the grace period
and, accordingly, retained the debt's long-term
classification. This finding counters one of the
concerns expressed in comment letters deahng
with SFAS No. 78, that the standard "substan-
tially removes any auditor judgment in evaluat-
ing how an obligation should be classified when
a violation exists." (SFAS No. 78, para. 16)
The results for the auditor's qualification
decision are comparable to the findings for the
reclassification decision. Of the 70 firms fail-
ing to receive waivers, 56 percent were issued
qualified opinions. In contrast, only 30 percent
of the 89 firms receiving waivers had their
audit opinions qualified. Similar associations
exist when qualifications are restricted to those
citing going concern problems. Roughly two-
thirds of the going concern opinions were is-
sued to firms that failed to have their initial
violations waived. In total, the data involving
^ Year-to-year changes in each of the four summary
measures are significant at, at least, the ten percent
level (two-tailed).
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TABLE 1
Median and Mean Values for Selected Financial Measures
for the Sample of 159 Firms Experiencing First-Time Debt Covenant Violations
Panel A: Median Values Over Time
Panel B: Comparison to Industry Mean in Year 0
Variable
Debt/Assets
Current Ratio
Earnings
Equity Value
Firm
Mean
0.73
1.37
-25.65
105.61
Industry t-
Mean
0.64
3.07
10.34
306.89
Statistic
4.27**
11.33**
4.60**
3.96**
** denotes significance at p < = 0.05.
Data are from the 1995 Compustat tapes.
Debt/Assets = Total Liabilities (Item No. 181)yTotal Assets (Item No. 6)
Current Ratio = Current Assets (Item No. 4)/Current Liabilities (Item No. 5)
Earnings = Earnings Before Extraordinary Items (Item No. 18)
Equity Value = Common Shares (Item No. 25) *Common Share Price (Item No. 199)
the waiver partition reveal that auditors incor-
porate lenders' decisions when they evaluate
firms that are in violation of their debt covenants.
Because over half of the firms failing to receive
waivers were not subject to reciassification, how-
ever, auditors do appear to exercise quite a bit of
judgment in determining the financial statement
presentation of violated debt.
Subsequent Period Problems
The second set of univariate tests, pre-
sented in table 3, examines the association be-
tween lenders' and auditors' decisions at the
date of initial default and financial distress
encountered by violating firms in subsequent
periods. In this framework, financial distress
is defined as either bankruptcy or debt service
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TABLE 2
Association Between Auditors' and Lenders* Responses
to Initial Debt Covenant Violations
Partition
No Waiver
Waiver
Partition
No Waiver
Waiver
Partition
No Waiver
Waiver
Debt Not
Reclassified
36
74
X' = 18.49**
Opinion Not
Qualified
31
62
X' = 10.39**
No Going Concern
Opinion
50
78
Debt
Reclassified
34
15
Opinion
Qualified
39
27
Going Concern
Opinion
20
11
= 6.56**
** denotes significance at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
default, which often leads to bankruptcy.* The
general hypothesis is that firms that fail to
receive waivers, that have their debt reclassi-
fied to short-term, and that receive qualified
opinions will be more likely to face financial
distress in future periods.
Table 3 illustrates that lenders' initial
waiver decisions are not significant determi-
nants of future distress and that auditors' ini-
tial debt reclassification decisions are only
marginally significant (p = 0.08). Specifically,
39 percent (19 of 49) of the reclassification firms
encountered financial distress in subsequent
periods, compared to only 25 percent (28 of 110)
of firms not experiencing debt reclassification.
The qualification decision, however, exhibits
a highly significant association with future fi-
nancial distress. Almost half (31 of 66) of the
firms receiving qualified audit opinions even-
tually experienced debt service default or filed
for bankruptcy. In contrast, only 17 percent
(16 of 93) of the firms that were Issued clean
opinions ultimately encountered financial dis-
tress. Stated differently, firms receiving quali-
fied opinions account for 66 percent of the in-
cidents of future debt service default or bank-
ruptcy even though they make up a minority
of the sample observations. Similar to the pre-
vious section, the results are comparable when
the qualification partition encompasses only
going concern opinions. In sum, the data pre-
sented in table 3 suggest that the initial deci-
sions of auditors, particularly decisions involv-
ing the audit opinion, can be used to assess
the likelihood that firms will encounter future
financial difficulties.
MULTIVARIATE TESTS
Table 4 presents three LOGIT models that
re-examine the previously discussed associa-
tions in a multivariate setting. Given the simi-
lar findings for general qualifications and for
going concern opinions noted throughout this
^ The empirical results are qualitatively unchanged
under a more restrictive definition which confines
financial distress to subsequent bankruptcy filings.
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TABLE 3
Relationship Between Auditors* and Lenders' Responses
and Future Financial Distress
Partition
No Waiver
Waiver
Partition
Debt Not Reclassified
Debt Reclassified
Partition
Opinion Not Qualified
Opinion Qualified
No Future Debt
Service Default or
Bankruptcy
X' = 2.28
No Future Debt
Service Default or
Bankruptcy
X' = 2.89*
No Future Debt
Service Default or
Bankruptcy
Future Debt
Service Default
or Bankruptcy
45
67
25
22
Future Debt
Service Default
or Bankruptcy
82
30
28
19
Future Debt
Service Default
or Bankruptcy
77
35
16
31
= 16.43**
No Future Debt
Service Default or
Partition Bankruptcy
No Going Concern Opinion
Going Concern Opinion
yz = 6.56**
** and * denote significance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively (two-tailed).
Future Debt
Service Default
or Bankruptcy
96
16
32
15
paper, separate models for firms receiving go-
ing concern opinions are not presented.^ The
first two panels of table 4 build from the
univariate analysis presented in table 2, and in-
volve the following specifications (expected signs
are shown below the variable designations):
RECLASS = ttj -i-YjWAIVER
(-)
+ Y QUALIFY + Y3LEVERAGE
(+) (+)
+ Y4ROA. (1)
QUALIFY = ttj
-I- Y4ROA + Y5CURRENT. (2)
As with the univariate tests, models defining "quali-
fication" as "going concern qualification" are very
similar to models utilizing a broader definition of
"qualification." The similarity is probably attributable
to the fact that qualifications issued prior to SAS No.
58 often highlighted material uncertainties such as
financing difficulties which were not initially signifi-
cant enough to warrant a going concern opinion.
These "subject-to" qualifications, however, may have
(Continued on next page)
46 Accounting Horizons I December 1997
Table 4
LOGIT Regressions Involving Initial Auditor Decisions and Future Financial Distress
Panel A: Debt Reclassification Decision
RECLASS = a^  + y, WAIVER + y^QUALIFY + ygLEVERAGE + y^ROA
CL V V V V
1 ' 1 ' 2 ' 3 h
Coefficient estimate -2.00
t-statistic -1.90*
-1.44
-3.06**
1.24
2.76**
1.88
1.29
0.08
0.06
Panel B: Audit Opinion
QUALIFY = a, + y^WAIVER + y^RECLASS + Y3LEVERAGE + y^ ROA + y^CURRENT
a.
Coefficient estimate
t-statistic
-0.82
-0.60
-0.13
-0.27
0.92
2.00**
1.41
0.94
-5.05 -1.13
-3.30** -2.76**
Panel C: Future Financial Distress
DISTRESS = ttj + y^WAIVER + y^  RECLASS + ygQUALIFY + y^LEVERAGE + y^ROA +y,CURRENTI   ^   ^  ,
T2 73 74 75
Coefficient estimate -3.90
t-statistic -2.60**
-0.34
-0.74
0.09
0.19
1.14
2.43**
4.04
2.45**
2.60
1.62
-0.04
-0.11
** and * denote significance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively (two-tailed).
DISTRESS = future distress; 0 = none or technical default, 1 = debt service default or bankruptcy,
WAIVER = 1 if initial violations were explicitly waived, 0 otherwise,
RECLASS = 1 if auditors initially reclassified violated debt to short-term, 0 otherwise,
QUALIFY = 1 if initial audit opinion was qualified, 0 othervdse,
LEVERAGE = total liabilities/total assets (Compustat Item No. 181/Item No. 6),
ROA = earnings before extraordinary items/total assets (Compustat Item No. 18 /Item No. 6),
CURRENT = current assets/current liabilities (Compustat Item No. 4 / Item No. 5).
In models (1) and (2), LEVERAGE is de-
fined as total liabilities divided by total assets,
CURRENT is defined as current assets divided
by current liabilities, and ROA is defined as earn-
ings before extraordinary items divided by total
assets. These three variables—representing fi-
nancial leverage, liquidity and profitability, re-
spectively—are continuous and are included
to control for the basic financial statement ef-
fects likely to be incorporated in both the re-
classification and qualification decision.^ All
other variables take the value of one when the
characteristic is present, and zero when the
characteristic is not present. Because the two
auditor decisions are not completely depen-
dent, the qualification variable is included in
the reclassification model, and vice versa.''
Panel A of table 4 presents evidence fi'om
the debt reclassification model. The significant
negative coefficient for WAIVER reveals that
firms receiving waivers are less likely to have
Footnote 5 (Continued)
provided the first indication of potential going con-
cern problems and/or financial distress.
^ If CURRENT is included in the reclassification re-
gression, the coefficient is significant and of the ap-
propriate sign (negative). However, it is difficult to
determine whether reclassification is genuinely more
likely when firms are having liquidity problems, or
whether the significant negative estimate exists be-
cause reclassification mechanically produces lower
current ratios. As a result, CURRENT is not included
in the formal presentation of model (1).
' Altbough it is likely that the qualification decision is
more dependent on the reclassification decision than
the reverse, generalizing this relationship is difficult.
An additional, and perhaps more likely, possibility is
that both decisions are dependent on a subset of the
auditor's private information regarding the firm,
which is acting as a correlated omitted variable in
panels A and B.
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their debt reclassified to short-term, a result
which is consistent with the development pre-
sented in section two. The significant positive
estimate for QUALIFY suggests that firms re-
ceiving qualified opinions are more likely to
have their debt reclassified. This association
supports the notion that some interaction ex-
ists between the auditor's reclassification de-
cision and the audit opinion. Neither of the
control variables is significant at conventional
levels. In total, the conclusions that can be
drawn from panel A are comparable to those
generated by the univariate tests shown in table 2.
Specifically, auditors rely, at least to some extent,
on lenders' decisions in evaluating whether the
debt should be reclassified as current.
In contrast to the findings regarding the
debt reclassification decision, panel B of table
4 illustrates that decisions regarding the au-
dit opinion are largely dependent on financial
data. The significant negative estimates for
both CURRENT and ROA reveal that firms
experiencing low liquidity and profitability lev-
els are more likely to receive qualified opin-
ions. The coefficient estimate for RECLASS is
significant as well, confirming the positive as-
sociation between the two auditor decisions
that is documented in panel A. After control-
ling for the reclassification decision and finan-
cial statement effects, however, the lender's
waiver decision does not contribute signifi-
cantly to the qualification model.^  Thus, al-
though a firm's failure to receive default waiv-
ers is an important determinant of the balance
sheet presentation of the violated debt, mea-
sures of financial health appear to be used more
consistently in the development of the audit
opinion.^
Panel C of table 4 presents the final LOGIT
specification, which evaluates the importance
of auditors' decisions in predicting future fi-
nancial distress. The specification tested in
panel C is as follows:
DISTRESS = ttj+
+ y RECLASS + Y3QUALIFY
(+) • (+)
+ Y LEVERAGE + Y5ROA
() ()
Y.CURRENT (3)
where DISTRESS is equal to 1 if the firm ex-
perienced either debt service default or bank-
ruptcy in future periods, and is equal to 0 for
all other cases. All other variables are as pre-
viously defined.
Panel C of table 4 illustrates that neither
the lender's waiver decision nor the auditor's
debt reclassification decision is important in
predicting future financial distress. Similarly,
although liquidity and profitability were found
to influence the auditor's qualification decision,
neither measure is significantly associated
with subsequent distress. The significance of
LEVERAGE, however, indicates that firms
having high levels of debt at the date of initial
default are more likely to encounter bank-
ruptcy in future periods. The auditor's qualifi-
cation decision is also found to be an impor-
tant predictor of finandal distress. Specifically,
the significance of the qualification decision
reveals that, given a debt covenant violation,
firms receiving qualified opinions have a
greater likelihood of experiencing severe finan-
cial problems in subsequent periods. Most im-
portantly, this result holds even after control-
ling for financial statement effects typically
associated with an increased probability of
bankruptcy. I
SUMMARY
The most recent trend in debt covenant re-
search has been to evaluate how different us-
ers respond to incidents of technical default.
Although studies have examined the responses
of managers, investors and creditors, little
emphasis has been placed on auditors' reac-
tions to debt covenant violations. The evidence
presented in this paper suggests, consistent
with SFAS No. 78, that auditors are more
likely to require that obligations be reclassi-
fied as current when the corresponding viola-
tions are not waived. The results also indicate
8 If RECLASS is omitted from model (2), WAIVER be-
comes significant. Given the lack of significance in
the complete model, however, it is likely that
WAIVER simply proxies for RECLASS in the reduced
model.
^ The pairwise correlations hetween the independent
effects in all of the models are relatively high. Col-
linearity diagnostics, however, do not suggest that
the integrity of the models is materially affected.
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that, conditional on technical default, the
auditor's initial qualification decision is a sig-
nificant predictor of financial distress, even
though such distress may not occur for several
years in the future. The latter finding, in
particular, offers additional support for
Nogler's (1995) defense of the integrity of the
audit opinion.
Because the sample used in this study in-
cludes pre-SAS No. 58 qualifications, additional
research in this area should examine the rela-
tion between covenant violations and opinions
that are guided by SAS No. 58. Such an analy-
sis would facilitate comparisons between "sub-
ject-to" opinions and the explanatory para-
graphs that are now used in practice. Research-
ers may also want to incorporate the opinions
of practitioners, gathered via survey or experi-
mental methods, in extending the models pre-
sented in this paper.
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